The neurosciences challenge particularly with reference to violence. Although explanations of violence are interdisciplinary it remains controversial to work across the division between the social and biological sciences. Neuroscience can be subject to familiar sociological critiques of scientism and reductionism but this paper considers whether this view should be reassessed. Concepts of brain plasticity and epigenetics could prompt reconsideration of the dichotomy of the social and natural while raising questions about the intersections of materiality, embodiment and social action. Although violence is intimately bound up with the body, sociologies of both violence and the body remain on the surface and rarely go under the skin or skulls of violent actors. This article argues for a non-reductionist realist explanation of violent behaviour that is also interdisciplinary and offers the potential to generate nuanced understandings of violent processes. It concludes that sociology should engage critically and creatively with the neuroscience of violence.
cannot resolve these it does suggest that the debate provides opportunities to reconsider sociological concepts of embodiment in relation to explanations of violence. There is often demand, especially from research councils, for greater interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary cooperation but in practice we are often inter, trans and multi with disciplines that are most cognate to our own and pose fewest challenges. Although bioscience is often accused of reductionism its recent emphasis on plasticity, and in particular epigenetics 2 , suggest productive ground for rethinking the tortured history of relations between biology and sociology. One might not go quite so far as Rose (2013) in N biological. Indeed, the reverse assumption is common passé, the linguistic turn has reached a dead end and a rhetoric of materiality is almost H if not universally) regarded in neuroscience as exaggerated and there are suggestions of possible rapprochement F the neuro than the social. Even so, a review of these formerly entrenched disciplinary divisions will pose challenges to both. This discussion focusses on these issues with reference to violence and addresses the question posed by Fitzgerald & Callard (2015) that in relation to social and neuroscience? It offers a different answer to theirs 3 but takes up
Rose and Abi-' p. neuroscience.
Sociology, violence and the body
Violent behaviour is complex and multi-layered and is unlikely to have simple explanations.
Some social conditions of crime and violence are well known, such as inequality, social exclusion, deprivation, cultures of masculinity, youth gang cultures, the drugs trade, consumerism and social strain. But these often over-predict its incidence while violent perpetrators might not fit these demographic profiles. Indeed, this leads some, such as Collins (2008, p.2-3) to dispute the relevance of social structural causes at all. However, paradoxically perhaps biosocial explanations might restate the significance of structural and demographic factors. Rudo-Hutt et al (2011) claim that hormones and neurotransmitters interact with social factors so that while deprivation might account for much violent crime, analysis of combinations of childhood abuse with deprivation and genetic risks point towards multi-layered explanations of violence. Social structure is relevant then in combination with other risk factors which might explain variance from typical demographic profiles. Further, reductionist versions of neuroscience (e.g. Rosenberg, 2006) are challenged by concepts of emergence understanding how phenomena not apparent in parts appear in the whole which allow multiple, genomic, neurological and social modes of explanation that overcome While recognising that the brain is the necessary condition for consciousness, since Cartesian dualism now seems untenable, we might rather think in realist terms of overdetermined bidirectional multiplicity. This might point a way out of the blind alleys of determinism and reductionism and view the brain and nervous system as nested in the body and environment such that their functions can be understood in relation to both.
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Violence is intimately to do with the body and engages intense emotional arousal, in particular, aggression, anger, hate and as Randall Collins (2008, passim) argues confrontation/fear. Yet violence has received surprisingly little attention from the sociology of embodiment, with the exception of feminist theories such as Grosz (1994) . Violence is mentioned only in passing in Shilling (2012) , Turner (1984) and Featherstone et al (1991) and not at all by Leder (1990) . Moreover, the previously absent body rediscovered in sociology is sometimes rather dis C
[on the body], the actual flesh and blood body, the body-brain system of neurones, hormones, glial cells, neuro-transmitters, muscles, bones and skin, is largely absent. In its Alcoholism commissioned research into exceptionally high rates of alcoholism among Native Americans they looked to Identify genes that are involved in alcohol-associated disorders, rather than social structural causes. In response to this trend he says that sociologists should more systematically demonstrate how the categories on which this apparently objective data is founded are really socially constructed. This is a valid though only partial critique.
It is true that diagnostic criteria and concepts are structured upon certain assumptions and understandings about social categories, which Hacking (1995) descr .
D
that locate social problems in individual pathology rather than in political issues of inequality and disadvantage (e.g. Eastman & Campbell, 2006) . Further, data is generated in a social context and brain sciences are embedded in 6 historical cultural, political and economic formations and brain images have been produced in laboratories. As Rose and Abi-Rached (2013, p.76 ) point out, r -sights. They are organized spaces in which multiple practices and disciplines including neuroscience, computational theory, physics, computer science, statistics, and nuclear medicine all intersect. There are resolution limitations in neuroimaging technology, limited participant selection and often inadequate distinction is made between different types of violence, notably impulsive and predatory (Bufkin & Luttrell, 2005 & Callard, 2015) . Fine (2010) shows how cultural biases enter experimental fMRI evidence of gender differences that then are recycled as
Rather than reject the method though she emphasises the importance of understanding brain interconnectivity rather than focus on particular cortical areas (2010, p.153) . On the other hand, neuroimaging is just one component of a wider set of social and life history data and cumulative evidence points to a strong association between increased aggressiveness and reduced pre-frontal cortex (PFC) activity (Brower & Price 2001) .
It is also true that caution should be exercised in the use of neurological explanations. First, even when present, brain damage may have an uncertain, or no relationship to the violent 7 behaviour. PFC disruption is only relevant in combination with social factors that may enhance or diminish it (Bufkin & Luttrell, 2005 
Neuroplasticity
Neurological research then is a social practice but, it will argued that a critical engagement with neuroscience within wider social theoretical debates is a challenge to reconsider the Indeed, recent developments in neurology render simplistic causal analysis out-dated since theories of neuroplasticity suggest new modes of biosocial intra-actions. However, neuroscience, as opposed to some popular representations of it, models complexity, plasticity and malleability of neural structures. Lamarckians on the transmissibility of acquired characteristics, which was for a long time thought heretical 7 . This is particularly salient for understanding both the bodily effects of violence and the mechanism for the neural coding of social influences. The environmental consequences of socially generated effects such as poverty, stress, exposure to toxins and poor diet prompt epigenetic mutation. (Oitzl et al, 2010; Sharkey 2010; Yakyavi, 2014) . Similarly studies with children of Holocaust survivors found increased susceptibility to stress across subsequent generations (Cicchetti et al, 2013 ) although this could also be transmitted environmentally. Nonetheless, it seems that persistent stress and fear have effects on brain development and can change neurocognitive functioning. Thus growing up in violent areas will have developmental effects since in neighbourhoods with high homicide rates children frequently experience fear, especially immediately following the discovery of a corpse, which in turn has effects on learning, memory and ability to deal with stress (Raine 2013, p.263) . In this way epigenetics as Rose (2013) (Staniloiu & Markowitsch, 2011) . However, these effects are differentiated since not everyone exposed to trauma will demonstrate altered HPA axis functioning (Neigh et al, 2009 ) suggesting that there are complex cumulative and intergenerational effects through which neural development is moulded historically.
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Towards a biosocial theory
If these observations are now focussed more closely on violence there are a number of issues to consider in developing a realist theory on multiple levels. The following discussion addresses two related aspects of this. First, the control paradigm in neuroscience, which has a parallel in sociology, both of which understand violence as a result of damaged or inadequate controls. Second, a more specific theory of emotionality and violence which integrates neurological and social explanations into a hypothetical model of violence and emotional entrainment.
Violence, control and complexity
A considerable amount of violence literature focusses on failures of control systems. This approach addresses mainly impulsive rather than predatory violence and will require qualifying in the following section but it enables us to think in terms of socio-neural systems. demonstrate that the location of the brain damage had affected his self-control as a result of damage to the organs of Veneration and Benevolence (Macmillan, 2010) . Whatever the facts of this case, the incident set the scene for subsequent neurological concepts of the frontal cortex control theories of violent behaviour and indeed for some simplification of
B associated with deficits in selfcontrol have a high probability of violence (DeLisi, 2015) . The orbital PFC is involved in many pacifying and controlling faculties of the mind, including planning, self-control, empathy and sensitivity to norms. It is claimed therefore that damage to or inadequate development of the PFC predisposes actors to increased impulsiveness and low inhibition (e.g. Pietrini & Bambini, 2009) . This is because the potential for violence, or at least aggressiveness, emotionality and impulsiveness arise from the core brain regions of oldest basal nuclei, the globus pallidus, the olfactory bulbs and amygdala, which in the functioning controlled brain are regulated by developed the PFC (Pallone & Hennessy, 1998; Brower & Price, 2001 ). The amygdala stores emotional memories, is central to learning to associate stimuli with consequences (Davidson et al, 2000) and reduces constraints on action when the actor perceives danger, so damage to neural circuits with the PFC can increase perception of and responses to threat (Fumagalli & Priori, 2012) . Disruption of the neurotransmitters regulating cortisol, serotonin and testosterone, it is claimed, are often linked to aggressive behaviour where levels of the former are low and of the latter high (e.g. Bernhardt, 1997; Kuepper et al, 2010; Mehta & Beer, 2010; Raine, 2013) . Dissociation of moral emotions from reasoning, where the actor has no interest in the consequences of their actions is also explained with reference to damage to the PFC and reduced metabolic activity (Haidt, 2001 ). Neuropsychological defects, such as brain dysfunction, hormone and neurotransmitter abnormalities in the limbic system and PFC can be identified in murderers and habitually violent offenders. According to Pallone and Hennessy (1998) (Buckholtz & Meyer-Lindenburg, 2008; Hacking, 2006; Ferguson & Beaver, 2009; Meloni, 2014) . There has been extensive research on the relationship the gene variant of the MAOA gene (that regulates neurotransmitters such as dopamine and serotonin) and childhood abuse. High levels of MAOA expression seem to protect against aggression in later life while low levels increase the risk (Roach & Pease 2015, p.75) . We might note though that Brunner, the psychiatrist initially involved in this research, has distanced himself from some of the claims made for it 10 and later findings are contradictory (Verhoeven et al, 2012) .
In a sense sociological control theories that regard violence as an outcome of defects in socially regulating bonds are the mirror of neuro control theories. Social control theory found increased empathetic mimicry among youths predisposed to aggression, so that the injury or hurt of a friend or gang member could provoke exaggerated aggressive responses.
What they do not note, however, is that this response in turn presupposes a social interactive process of group bonding and in-out group affective identifications and For control theories violent emotions arise from below so to speak, from deep regions of the brain. However, violence is not only a control problem but on the contrary also involves overriding feelings of compassion and be directed by higher cognitive functions. Indeed, the C rather than decontrolled raging. In this context one can distinguish ferocious from callous violence (Collins, 1974) 
The materiality of emotions
There are parallels between social and biosocial control theories although this approach to experiments (Barbalet 2001, p.143) . Indeed, arguably, judgements about action involve moral emotions more than they do moral reasoning which is rarely the direct cause of actions and reasoning is often formulated ex post facto and orientated to social expectations (Haidt, 2001 Emotional responses then are structured by social relations (in this case gender) but manifest along pathways that are not easily available to verbal recognition and articulation. This is why both interpersonal and macro conflicts that are embedded in shame dynamics become interminable cycles of quarrels and impasses that will not be susceptible to easy resolution. Further these styles of communication are learned in childhood (Scheff 2006b, p.31) and structure adult relationships although they will be culturally variable arising from differential socialization patterns. In an , violence might be a socially expected response among men to a perceived shaming (see for example Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) .
This model has been applied in various ways. For example, Ray et al (2004) argued with reference to racist violence and Ray (2014) (1999, p. that , p.146) . He continues to suggest that shame involves mystery, something hidden, isolation from community, moral inferiority, vulnerability, and a sense of chaos.
These accounts though do not explore the embodidness of emotion or repression as a psychoneural process. While the source of humiliation will be social, as a feeling it is expressed in the brain and engages complex neural processes, being then an example of biosocial feedback that entails both non-linguistic feelings and linguistic communications. It (1995, p.209) suggests unconsciously seeks to induce in others the experience of traumatic breakdown in trust in the benignity of the world that they experienced. Violence breaks through to remaster trauma and convert anxiety into excitement (1995, 209) . This model proposes multiple non-reducible levels of biography, self, neural process, socio-political contexts and the feedbacks between them. While these feelings arise in part endogenously they are also likely to find legitimation in networks of other individuals thus achieving both solidarity and a coordinated arousal of the limbic system in a sense of unity. Nothing as René Girard comment socially cathartic as righteous violence especially when Girard, 1977, p.78) This feedback between feelings, body and group might be short-lived, as in the moral holiday afforded by a riot, or is encoded into habits of action and persist over longer periods and transmitted across generations. In the latter case it can be so to speak I example the humiliation of defeat is often nurtured more caringly than the celebration of victories one instance of this was the 1389 Serbian defeat at Kosovo Polje (Ray, 1999) . In this way interpersonal and collective violence can be understood as outcomes of complex overdetermined neural, historical and social processes.
DIAGRAM 1 HERE
Conclusion
T and identifications in relation to socia one answer is that we would approach the latter with critical and sceptical openness. A better understanding of both the sociological body and violence might be developed through engagement with neuroscience on the basis of a non-reductive epistemological pluralism that moves beyond a human subject divided along disciplinary lines into a bodily and social presence. 2 An epigenetic effect is where the DNA nucleotide remains fixed but chromatin proteins that affect gene expression may become altered by the environment throughout life and transfer to next generation (Champagne, 2010) .
3 Theirs is to write novel genealogies of entanglement of social and natural informed by Actor Network Theory. 4 Siegel et al (2013) found that in the US each percentage increase in gun ownership was accompanied by a 0.9
per cent increase in homicide. 6 Third-person mindreading though, as Nichols and Stich (2003) show, is a rather complicated process. 7 Epigenetics, still at an early stage of development, appears overcome the Weismann Barrier the principle that hereditary information moves only from genes to body cells, and never in reverse (Fuller, 2011, p.20) . 8 The HPA axis is a limbic feedback process that releases the hormone cortisol in response to stress while a poorly functioning HPA can increase vulnerability to stress (Smith et al, 2006) .
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D G the frontal cortex, at the position assumed to be responsible for regulation of social behaviour (Pietrini & Bambini, 2009 ). Even so, some accounts suggest that his personality change was less pronounced and more temporary than often suggested (e.g. Macmillan, 2000; Macmillan & Lena, 2010) , which would make the case even more neurologically interesting. Damasio (2012, p.202) does not claim that these levels of the self correspond to cerebral localities but rather emerge from systematic cooperation between the brain stem and cerebral cortex. 
